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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
character of the acts necessary to constitute actual
possession, the intention of the possessor, and the cir-
cumstances in the case."' 8
Although it did not describe what constitutes abandon-
ment of adverse possession, the Maryland Court of Appeals
seems to take a strict view of the rights of the adverse pos-
sessor in this respect. Not only must there be sufficient
acts to constitute adverse possession ab initio, but there
must be ample evidence of the continuation of these acts
for the statutory period in order for the adverse claimant
to acquire good title. It appears from the holding in this
case that Maryland rejects the liberal view that in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, when adverse pos-
session is once shown it is generally presumed to continue.
HowARD S. CHASANOW
The Discovery And Production Of Grand Jury
Proceedings
United States v. The Proctor and Gamble Company et al.1
The Supreme Court heard the instant case on appeal
by the United States from a ruling of the District Court
of New Jersey, dismissing a civil suit by the government
under Section 4 of the Sherman Act. In preparing its
case, the government had used minutes of a previous grand
jury proceeding in which the government had failed in its
attempt to secure an indictment against the same defen-
dants for possible violation of anti-trust laws.
Defendants' request for discovery and production of
these minutes, on the grounds that they would be preju-
diced in the preparation of their defense without them,
was granted by the lower Court under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.2 The government had argued for the
"'Ibid., Sec. 1162.
'356 U.S. 677 (1958).
2 28 U.S.C.A. (1958). Rule 34 provides in part:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, and subject to the prvisions of Rule
30 (b), the Court in which an action is pending may (1) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photograph-
ing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
• . . not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to
any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26 (b) and which are In his possession, custody, or control . .. ."
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traditional policy of secrecy over grand jury proceedings.
The District Court, however, held that defendants had
met the requirement of "good cause" and that the "ends
of justice" required breaking this seal of secrecy. The
District Court, therefore, ordered the government to turn
over the minutes in question. The government was adam-
ant in its refusal to obey and filed a motion in the District
Court to the effect that if the Court's orders were not
obeyed, the case should be dismissed.4 The District Court
entered judgment of dismissal.
On the main issue, the Supreme Court reversed the
lower Court, and held that Proctor and Gamble had failed
to establish "good cause" as required by Rule 34 and was
not entitled to discovery and production of the grand jury
minutes.' The Court then expounded the broad doctrine
that:
"... the grand jury as a public institution serving the
community might suffer if those testifying today
knew that the secrecy of their testimony would be
lifted tomorrow. This 'indispensable secrecy of grand
jury proceedings'.. . must not be broken except where
there is compelling necessity . . . shown with par-
ticularity."'
The Court found no such showing in this case.7 In a sepa-
rate concurring opinion, Justice Whittaker proposed that
grand jury minutes be impounded by the Court when no
indictment was voted so that the rule of secrecy would be
invoked against the government as well as against the
defendant in any subsequent civil proceeding.
Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Burton dissented,
arguing that the real issue was not whether "good cause"
under Rule 34 was shown, but rather whether the District
Court had abused its discretion in ordering the government
8 U. S. v. Proctor and Gamble Company, 19 F.R.D. 122, 125 (1956).
'It is noted that the court could dismiss the action on the grounds that
its orders were niot obeyed under Rule 37 (b) (2) (iv) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1958).5 The Supreme Court had first disposed of Proctor's argument that the
appeal could not be maintained because it was solicited by the govern-
ment. The Court held that when the government proposed dismissal for
failure to obey the District Court's order, it had lost the case on its merits
and was only seeking expeditious review.
'Supra, n. 1, 986.
Supra, n. 1, 987. The Supreme Court went on to point out that only
where it is proven that the grand jury procedure was subverted would
there be grounds for wholesale discovery and production of the transcript
and In the absence of this, only a limited and discreet lifting of the
secrecy would be warranted.
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to furnish a transcript of the minutes. The dissent was
unwilling to hold that there had been any abuse of dis-
cretion.
Historically speaking, secrecy was not a requirement or
even a right of the grand jury until late in the 17th Century
when in the famous Lord Shaftesbury case this ancient
English body insisted on hearing witnesses in private in
proceedings leading to a refusal to indict the Earl for high
treason.' From that time on secrecy became established
as an important characteristic of the grand jury proceed-
ing, along with the other elements deemed so necessary to
the fulfillment of its important role: ". . . freedom from
technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one
because of prejudice and to free no one because of special
favor."9 This grand jury system was created in the United
States Constitution by substantially similar language.'l
It is plain that this tradition of secrecy became firmly
fixed in the developmental years of the grand jury in this
country, as shown by the oft-quoted statement of Judge
Learned Hand in his reply to a defendant's request for
access to grand jury minutes:
"I am no more disposed to grant it than I was in 1909.
U. S. v. Violin, 173 F. 501. It is said to lie in discretion
and perhaps it does, but no judge of this court has
granted it and I hope none ever will.""
Despite this long and strongly supported tradition of
secrecy, it became apparent that situations might arise
which would necessitate modifying this stand. Hence, un-
der the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," a party in a
civil proceeding may be entitled to discovery and produc-
tion of the grand jury proceedings upon a showing of "good
cause". The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1 con-
s Daniel, Secrecy and the Grand Jury in South Carolina, 7 S.C.L.Q. 455
(1945).
OCostello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
U. S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 5.
'1 United States v. Garsson, et al., 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
Supra, n. 2.
'18 U.S.C.A. (1958) Rule 6 (e) provides in part:
"Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than
its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the nttor-
neys for the government for use In the performance of their duties.
Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpretor, or stenographer may dis-
close matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed
by the Court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding 'or when permitted by the Court at the request of the defen-
dant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss
the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except In
accordance with this rule."
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tain a similar provision but one which requires a showing
that grounds exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
The instances where courts have been called upon in
civil proceedings to rule upon the merits of defendant's
request for discovery and production of grand jury min-
utes are rare. 4 However, it has often been ruled upon in
criminal proceedings. 5
In the instant case, the Supreme Court referred to sev-
eral criminal cases to support its position.16 In view of this
it would seem that, though the fact situations differ and
the rules are distinct, the application of these rules for
disclosure in civil and criminal cases call forth the same
broad requirement of "good cause". And more important,
they call forth the same principlei and reasons for non-
disclosure which must be overcome.17 Thus, while Judge
Leahy feels that reasons for production of the secret jury
matter are less cogent in civil proceedings," Judge Hand
feels there could not be less reason for their production
in criminal cases.'9
What then can we look for the courts to say about this
"good cause", which alone will open the door to grand jury
records?
Three general attitudes seem discernible from the cases
and opinions surveyed: (1) that the records of grand jury
proceedings should never be invaded; (2) that a limited
and discreet production is permissible in cases which suc-
cessfully meet objective standards of "good cause"; (3)
that the rules for discovery and production should be more
flexibly applied and left wholly to the discretion of the
trial judge.
"4United States v. General Motors Corporation, 15 F.R.D. 486 (1954)
where defendant's request was denied; United States v. Morgan Stanley
and Company, 76 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) where Judge Medina in
a verbal ruling from the bench also denied defendant's request.
IIbid., 487. Judge Leahy gives a collection of criminal cases in point.
16 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) ; Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359 (1956). The latter case presents a brief history of the grand
jury system.
17 The reasons behind the 'tradition of non-disclosure, to be referred to
later, are well described in Goodman v. United States, 108 F. 2d 516, 519
(9th Cir. 1939).
Supra, n. 4, 488.
19 Supra, n. 11, 649, in which Judge Hand stated:
"While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he (the defen-
dant) need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is im-
mune friom question or comment on his silence. . . . Why in addition
he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick
over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see."
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The stalwart of the inflexible stand is, as one would
expect, Judge Hand, but this same attitude can be fairly
detected (though not so boldly stated) as late as 1954, when
in U. S. v. General Motors Corporation,° Judge Leahy
stated:
"Disclosure could seriously impair the grand jury
system, the freedom and effectiveness of its inquiry
and deliberation. Any precedent that evidence before
a grand jury may at some future time be disclosed to
probable examination of civil litigants in preparation
of the trial of their cause . . . would tend to restrict
free function of the grand jury."
The second attitude seems to represent the majority
view2' and is the stand taken by the Supreme Court in
the subject case. The only "good cause" for which whole-
sale discovery and production of grand jury minutes would
be warranted, is proof that the criminal procedure was
subverted. And for any "discrete and limited" disclosure
there must be a compelling necessity shown with particu-
larity.22 Examples which the Court gives are "to impeach
a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility
and the like".2" Thus, this Court felt that defendant had
not shown a particularized need in regard to the grand
jury testimony of any one witness. Therefore, the whole-
sale delivery of the entire transcript ordered by the lower
Court without any evidence of subversion was totally un-
justified. 4
In other cases which fall into the group following the
view of this case, various phrases have been used to de-
scribe what they would accept as "good cause." Thus we
find courts using such phrases as "a positive showing or
allegation of facts"; 25 and "sufficient reason".26 In cases
where wholesale discovery and production were requested,
the courts were precise in calling for clear proof of a sub-
verted proceeding, showing that the jury was improperly
constituted, or that there was fraud, misconduct or cor-
2OSupra, n. 14, 488.
"United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.C. N.J. 1952); United
States v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D.C. Mass. 1942);
United States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n., 61 F. Supp. 590
(D.C. N.J. 1945).
Supra, n. 1, 684.
2356 U.S. 677, 683; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
Ibid., 684.
"United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 705 (W.D. La. 1949).
2United States v. Potts, 57 F. Supp. 206, 207 (M.D. Pa. 1944).
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ruption present in the proceedings which violated defen-
dant's constitutional rights.17 Whatever descriptive words
were used, the implication was that the defendant had to
do more than, merely challenge the legality of the indict-
ment or, as in this case where there was no indictment,
show that he needed the information for purposes of
thoroughness in preparing his case. It was the belief of
the above courts that the secrecy of grand jury hearings,
whether viewed in historical perspective, or in the light
of current judicial thought, was still fundamental to the
proper functioning of that body, and only the most com-
pelling necessity justified disclosure of its proceedings.
The dissent in the instant case (and also the lower
Court's opinion) represents the third attitude in respect
to the tradition of secrecy.2" To this group the phrase "good
cause" is not a rule which is applied objectively within
limits of a "particularized need" and supported by positive
facts. It is in the last analysis a vague sort of guide for the
use of a trial judge's discretion. This exercise of discretion
becomes the main issue in cases where the request for dis-
covery and production of grand jury minutes is granted,
and not whether "good cause" has been shown. And the
feeling of this group is that such discretion should not
be lightly disturbed.
Another proposition advanced by advocates of this
more liberal position is that once the grand jury's, function
has ended, secrecy may be considered less vital.29 The
Court, in U. S. v. American Medical Association," held
that a jury is not released from its oath by operation of
indictment, arrest of accused or expiration of the jury
term, and that such release from oath may only come from
the Court when justice requires it.
Perhaps the most forceful argument of this dissent was
their pointing out of the fundamental unfairness and in-
equality in allowing the government's attorneys to possess
and use the grand jury minutes while denying such use
to the defendants. There is a clear implication in their
opinion, moreover, that the government's motivations in
prosecuting the prior criminal proceedings were not clearly
0 United States v. Olney, 21 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. N.Y. 1937); United
States v. Gouled, 253 F. 242 (S.D. N.Y. 1918).
See alsto: DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2nd Cir. 1925) Bassel-
man v. United States, 239 F. 82 (2nd Cir. 1917) ; Felder v. United States,
9 F. 2d 872 (2nd Cir. 1925).
'.See also: Metzler v. United States, 64 F. 2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933);
Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908).
10 United States v. American Medical Asgociation, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.C.
D.C. 1939).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
above reproach,"' an implication which prompted the ma-
jority to state their confidence in the integrity of the
prosecution.8 2 In the light of these considerations Justice
Whittaker's proposal in his concurring opinion would
seem to merit further attention. However, such impound-
ing of the grand jury minutes where no indictment is re-
turned would require amending the now existing rules.
Viewing the more modern trend as a whole, it seems
safe to conclude that federal courts generally will take
a middle-of-the-road policy in the strictness with which
they will apply the rules of discovery to the traditionally
secret grand jury minutes. That wholesale discovery of
the minutes should be granted only upon proof that the
proceedings were subverted seems reasonable under the
existing rules if the necessary secrecy is to be substantially
preserved. The further view, that limited and discreet lift-
ing of the non-disclosure rule is justified only when a show-
ing of "good cause" has been demonstrated by proof of
a particular need, is a fair attempt to apply the discovery
rules objectively. While it is true that such an approach
will sometimes work hardships, it is counter-balanced by
the broad scope of the rules of discovery in federal pro-
cedure, which offer the defendant many other means of
gaining the same information. The logic which dictated
the establishment of this tradition of secrecy is based on
far more substantial considerations than that of allowing
a defendant greater thoroughness in preparing his civil
suit.
JOsEPH A. MATERA
Unemployment Insurance Benefits - Refusal
To Answer "Security" Questions As
Wilful Misconduct
Ostrofsky v. Maryland Employment Security Board'
The claimants, employees of Bethlehem Steel Company,
were summoned before the UmAmerican Activities Com-
mittee in Baltimore and were identified by a witness as
former members of the Communist Party. The employees
refused to answer questions concerning their Communist
Supra, n. 1, 690.
Ibid., 684.
1218 Md. 509, 147 A. 2d 741 (1959).
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